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ABSTRACT 
Instrumental reasons play a central role in our practical deliberations because we apply 
the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable not only to beliefs, but to actions 
also. The question of what one has an instrumental reason to do is an important 
substantive question that is relevant to the general theory of practical reasoning and to 
ethics, too. It will be my object in the present study to show that we have different kinds 
of instrumental reasons, which depend solely on their logical structure. To this end, I shall 
in the first section deal with the validity of instrumental reasoning in general. In the 
remainder of the paper I outline five types of instrumental reasons and show how they 
depend on their logical structure. In so doing, I hope to shed some light on the concept of 
instrumental reasons, which is not well understood. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since Aristotle it has been common among philosophers to distinguish 
between theoretical and practical reasoning. We do not only want to work 
out what is the case, we also reason about what to do. Arguing that the 
selling of human organs should be outlawed because allowing them to be sold 
will inevitably lead to a situation where only the rich will be able to afford 
transplants is a simple example of practical reasoning. Practical reasoning is, 
however, a many-faceted activity that includes a variety of distinct types of 
arguments. Some are studied in deontic logic, and the theory of games is 
concerned with reasoning when our choices are not independent of how other 
people choose. In this essay, I have nothing to say about these types of 
practical reasoning. I shall here confine myself to instrumental reasons only. 
Although there is a vast literature on instrumental reasons, I think it is 
fair to say that the concept of an instrumental reason for acting is still not 
well understood. Philippa Foot once wrote that she did not understand the 
idea of a reason for acting and wondered whether anyone else did either (see 
Railton 1997, 53), and it seems to me that the situation has not changed 
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much. Philosophers still often assume, or write as if they assume, that if 
doing a certain action is necessary for achieving an agent’s end he has at least 
a pro tanto reason for performing that action.1 This view is, however, 
oversimplified for a number of reasons. In this article I shall focus only on 
one such reason: the fact that there are different kinds of instrumental 
reasons that depend solely on their logical structure. Astonishingly, this fact 
has escaped the notice of most writers in the field of practical reasoning, and 
this has led to common misconceptions about instrumental reasons. For 
instance, Hubin (1996, 44) holds that we have reasons to perform those 
actions that promote states of affairs which we intrinsically desire,2 and 
Kearns and Star (2008) hold that a reason for one to act in a particular way 
is, in effect, to say that one ought to act in that way (p. 32). As will become 
clear in what follows, such views are erroneous. 
In short, the aim of this paper is to shed some light on the concept of 
instrumental reasons by outlining five types of such reasons, all of which 
depend solely on their logical structure. However, before going on to a 
detailed consideration of instrumental reasons and their logical 
determination, some clarifications are called for. 
(i) For ease of exposition, I shall here only be concerned with reasoning 
under certainty. Reasoning is said to be under certainty if the arguer knows, 
at least for practical purposes, of each of his options what the outcomes of his 
taking it would be. Certainty is the simplest case of instrumental reasoning 
because no probabilities enter. 
(ii) In the present work I am not concerned with practical rationality. 
Authors often do not clearly distinguish between instrumental reasons and 
instrumental rationality (see e.g., Beardman 2007; Hubin 2001; Raz 2005). 
Practical rationality is broader and more complex than the concept of a 
practical reason and it depends on a number of issues that we need not here 
explore. For instance, it implies epistemic problems and, according to Searle 
(2001), it even involves metaphysical issues such as the problem of free 
choice. 
(iii) Many authors have a too narrow conception of instrumental reasons. 
On their view, such reasons serve only to promote the realization of the 
agent’s ends, which are given antecedently (see Heath 1997, 453). It is worth 
observing, however, that this describes only the standard neo-Humean 
                                                 
1 Compare to this Korsgaard (1997, 215). She is, however, no supporter of this view. 
2 This view is shared by Beardman (2007) only with the qualification that the means must 
be “necessary and available” (p. 259). 
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account of instrumental reasons, which is admittedly the most influential 
theory of practical reasons but by no means the only one. Instrumental 
reasons need to be construed more broadly. If an agent has an instrumental 
reason for -ing (where ‘’ stands in for some verb of action or for verb 
phrases) then -ing need not promote one of the agent’s contingent desires. It 
can, for instance, promote the realization of an intrinsic value. In the 
example given at the beginning, the reasoner may well hold that it is an 
intrinsic evil that only the rich will be able to afford transplants and this can 
give him an instrumental reason for holding that the selling of human organs 
should be outlawed. Put another way, instrumental reasons need not be 
“desire-dependent”, to borrow a term from Searle (2001). There is a 
controversy in the philosophical literature about whether or not all 
instrumental reasons are desire-dependent (or “internal”) reasons. Searle and 
other so-called externalists argue that there are also desire-independent 
reasons. In this paper I shall focus on desire-dependent reasons, but I wish to 
emphasize that my results are relevant to desire-independent reasons, too. 
(iv) Instrumental reasoning is defeasible, and a logic of instrumental 
reasoning is therefore, in the technical jargon, non-monotonic. This is to say 
that if a conclusion follows validly from given premises, it need not follow 
from a larger set of premises, even if the original premises are included. In 
other words, saying that a conclusion follows defeasibly means that it follows 
relative to a given set of premises. Considering additional alternatives or new 
consequences may "defeat" the reasoning. Let a single example serve to 
illustrate this: You want to fly to Paris tonight, and you can get seats on Air 
France and Lufthansa. Since the fare on Air France is lower (and there are no 
other differences) you conclude that you should take Air France. But then 
you learn that KLM offers a flight to Paris also, for an even lower fare than 
Air France (again, by hypothesis there are no other differences). This 
additional premise "defeats" the original reasoning. It no longer follows that 
you should take Air France; the new conclusion is that you better take KLM. 
The reasons that I shall be discussing in this paper are therefore only pro 
tanto reasons that can be overridden by new outcomes or by further 
alternatives.3 
So far, everything in this paper has been a matter of preliminary ground 
                                                 
3 Philosophers have long been aware of this feature of practical reasoning (see e.g., Geach 
1966) and have therefore held that practical reasoning is only prima facie valid (e.g., Audi 
1991; Clarke 1985; or Kenny 1978), that it provides only pro tanto reasons (e.g., Kagan 
1989) or reasons "other things being equal" (e.g., Baier 1953). 
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clearing. Now we have to go to work on the constructive part. In the pages 
that follow I shall in Section 1 outline when instrumental reasoning is valid. 
In the remainder of this essay I shall explain the logical varieties of 
instrumental reasons. 
 
 
2. On the Logic of Instrumental Reasoning 
 
As I have already mentioned, in this paper I shall argue that there are 
varieties of instrumental reasons that are determined by the logical structure 
of a piece of reasoning. To be reason-giving, this reasoning needs to be valid 
(or the agent needs at least a justification for believing that it is valid). 
Therefore, I need first to explain when instrumental reasoning is valid.4 In 
this section I shall explain the basics of its logic, leaving details for 
subsequent sections. 
I want to start with a simple example: “I believe that my garden will 
only grow if I water it. I want the garden to grow; and therefore I prefer to 
water it.” This is a description of an elementary piece of instrumental 
reasoning.5 Like all reasoning, it is an activity that takes place in the 
reasoner’s mind and it takes us from existing states of mind, the “premise-
states”, to a new state, the “conclusion-state”, to adopt Broome’s (2001, 176) 
terms. At an intuitive level, this is valid reasoning. But what makes 
instrumental reasoning valid? In a nutshell, instrumental reasoning is valid if 
                                                 
4 I take it for granted here that a piece of instrumental reasoning can be logically valid. 
This view is by no means beyond dispute. Many logicians and philosophers endorse it, but 
several writers have argued against it. Since a consideration of this issue would take us 
beyond the confines of the present work and I have argued for the validity of practical 
arguments elsewhere (see Spielthenner 2007), I shall not pursue this issue further here. 
5 Throughout this essay I shall assume that the conclusion of instrumental reasoning is an 
intentional attitude (e.g., your preferring x to y or your being indifferent between x and y) 
and not a normative statement such as “I ought to prefer x to y”. In everyday life we tend 
to attach deontic modalities to the conclusion of our reasoning. For instance, we might say 
that given my premises I ought to water the garden. This is grammatically correct but it 
misrepresents the logic of what is said. What we should rather say is something like ‘It 
ought to be that if I believe that my garden will only grow if I water it and I want the 
garden to grow then I water the garden.’ More technically, the ‘ought to’ should govern 
the entire reasoning rather than its conclusion. We attach modalities to the conclusion in 
theoretical reasoning also; for instance, when we say that Smith must be happy if everyone 
is happy. We are, however, aware that strictly speaking we should rather say ‘It is 
necessary that Smith is happy if everyone is happy’ since we know that the premises of a 
valid argument do not necessitate the conclusion. 
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(and only if) the set consisting of the premises and the negation of the 
conclusion is inconsistent. For definiteness, let me state this basic fact in the 
following principle of valid instrumental reasoning: 
(P) A piece of instrumental reasoning that consists of the 
premises P1, …, Pn and the conclusion C is valid iff the set {P1, 
…, Pn, C} is inconsistent. 
The key notion is now “inconsistency”, which may seem a suspect notion 
because it is not plain when the premises of a piece of instrumental reasoning 
and the negation of its conclusion are inconsistent. My next objective is 
therefore to explain when instrumental reasoning is inconsistent. 
To understand the concept of practical inconsistency, we need to be clear 
that the premises and the conclusion of a piece of instrumental reasoning are 
intentional attitudes (not statements or propositions). In our simple example, 
the premises are your belief that the garden will grow only if you water it and 
your wanting the garden to grow. The conclusion is your preference for 
watering the garden. Beliefs and preferences have contents, which I take to 
be propositions.6  
The point to emphasize now is that a piece of instrumental reasoning is 
not inconsistent because its contents are inconsistent in the sense that it is 
impossible for all of them to be true. What renders instrumental reasoning 
inconsistent is rather a special logical relationship between the contents of its 
premises and the conclusion. These preparatory explanations will need 
refinement. We will get to this in the pages that follow where I have more to 
say about this logical relationship by distinguishing reasoning that has a 
preference as its conclusion from reasoning that derives a dispreference or 
concludes in an indifference. 
 
 
3. Reasoning for Preferences 
                                                 
6 This view is not uncontroversial. Some authors have doubted that the contents of 
intentional states are always propositions. For instance, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-
Rasmussen (2004) hold that also things and persons can be the contents of such attitudes 
(p. 393). But others have convincingly argued that beliefs and preferences are 
propositional attitudes. We do, for instance, not prefer coffee to tea as such but rather 
drinking coffee to drinking tea (Hansson, 2006); and Searle (2001) holds that “all desires 
have whole propositions as intentional contents (thus ‘I want your car’ means something 
like ‘I want that I have your car’) …” (p. 248-9). Assuming that preferences and beliefs 
are propositional attitudes has the additional advantage that I can use propositional logic 
for analysing practical reasoning and for assessing its validity. 
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This essay is concerned with instrumental reasons, i.e., reasons given by 
pieces of instrumental reasoning. Since instrumental reasoning requires at 
least an implicit comparison of available alternatives and the sets of their 
outcomes (if there is no choice we do not reason what to do), I shall focus here 
on dyadic (or comparative) valuations, which indicate a relation between two 
(or more) relata. The two fundamental comparative value concepts are 
(strict) preference and indifference. They are usually denoted by the symbols 
‘’ and ‘’ respectively; and ‘a  b’ is commonly taken to mean both that a is 
preferred to b and that b is dispreferred to a. I take the term ‘a  b’ to mean 
that the agent assigns more value to a than to b, and ‘a  b’ to mean that he 
values a and b equally. With these preliminaries out of the way, I can now 
explain when instrumental reasoning that has a preference as conclusion is 
valid. 
A fresh scenario will help. Suppose that a mountaineer wants to scale a 
peak. He justifiedly believes that there are only two routes: The eastern route 
that leads to the peak and the southern route, which leads to a glacial lake. 
The mountaineer prefers standing on the peak to reaching the lake and he 
therefore prefers taking the eastern route rather than the southern one. This 
is a description of a piece of prima facie valid instrumental reasoning. It is a 
special kind of instrumental reasoning because its conclusion is a preference. 
We can call it instrumental reasoning for a preference. The mountaineer can 
express his conclusion in different waysfor example, by holding that he 
must take the eastern route. As we shall see, we need to distinguish between 
the conclusion of a piece of reasoning (which is an intentional attitude) and 
the expression of this attitude. There is quite a broad range of modal words 
that can be used for expressing the conclusion of a piece of practical 
reasoning. 
In order to assess the validity of this reasoning, it is helpful to translate it 
into symbolic form. This requires augmenting propositional logic by the 
dyadic preference and indifference relations   ψ and   ψ where ‘’ and ‘ψ’ 
can stand for simple propositions (in terms of propositional logic) or for 
compound propositions. Let ‘e’ mean ‘I take the eastern route,’ ‘s’ mean ‘I 
take the southern route,’ and let us use ‘p’ for ‘I will be standing on the peak,’ 
and ‘l’ for ‘I will reach the lake.’ 
If we interpret the reasoning as suggested (writing ‘B’ for ‘I believe that’ 
and ‘’ for ‘I prefer that’assuming that the mountaineer expresses his 
reasoning to himself in the first person), we get this formalization: B(e  p), 
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B(s  l), p  l ╞ e  s. Let me explain. On the left side of ‘╞’ (the “double 
turnstile”) are the premises of the reasoning and on its right side is the 
conclusion. The premises ‘B(e  p)’ and ‘B(s  l)’ stand for the reasoner’s 
beliefs; the premise ‘p  l’ and the conclusion ‘e  s’ refer to his preferences. 
This piece of instrumental reasoning takes the reasoner from three “premise-
states” to a “conclusion-state”. 
In the previous section, I have claimed that instrumental reasoning is 
valid iff its premises and the negation of the conclusion are inconsistent. This 
is to say that the piece of preferential reasoning under consideration is valid 
iff the set {B(e  p), B(s  l), p  l, (e  s)} is inconsistent. Now, on the 
plausible assumption that (e  s)  (e  s)  (s  e)that is, the assumption 
that e and s are commensurable on an ordinal levelit follows from (e  s) 
that (e  s)  (e  s).7 Therefore, we can replace the above set by the set {B(e 
 p), B(s  l), p  l, (e  s)  (e  s)} and test it for inconsistency. 
Intuitively, this set is inconsistent. (i) Believing that you can reach the 
peak if you take the eastern route, (ii) believing that you get to the lake if 
you take the southern route, (iii) preferring to stand on the peak and at the 
same time (iv) preferring to take the southern route is, to adopt a term from 
I. Kant, an “inconsistency in will”. You would prefer doing something that 
entails an outcome you disprefer and you would disprefer performing an 
action that entails an outcome you prefer. I think upon reflection it is clear 
that holding (i) to (iv) is holding a practically inconsistent set. 
On the assumption that the reasoner, valuer, and agent are the same 
person (which is not always the case), we can now generalize the 
considerations in the previous paragraph as follows: A set that consists of the 
premises of a piece of reasoning and the negation of its conclusion is 
inconsistent if the preferred relatum of the negated conclusion (in our 
example s) logically entails a state of affairs that is (in this piece of reasoning) 
dispreferred to the state that is entailed by the dispreferred relatum of the 
negated conclusion (in our example e). This way of putting it is admittedly 
somewhat unwieldy. It will therefore be helpful to rely on the following 
simpler but equivalent explanation of practical inconsistency that does not 
refer to the negated conclusion (C) but to the original conclusion (C) of the 
reasoning: 
(E) The set {P1, …, Pn, C}, consisting of the premises P1, 
…, Pn and the conclusion C, is inconsistent if the preferred 
                                                 
7 I use the symbol ‘’ for the exclusive disjunction of two statements, as usual in Boolean 
algebra. 
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relatum of the conclusion C entails a state of affairs that is (in 
this piece of reasoning) preferred to the state that is entailed by 
the dispreferred relatum of the conclusion. 
In our example, the preferred relatum of the conclusion C is e and the 
dispreferred relatum is s. The preferred relatum e, together with the 
propositional contents of the premises B(e  p), B(s  l)that is, (e  p) 
and (s  l)entails p, which the mountaineer prefers to the state l that is 
entailed by the dispreferred relatum s. The set {B(e  p), B(s  l), B(p  l), 
(e  s)  (e  s)} is therefore inconsistent. 
Now, from the principle of valid instrumental reasoning (P) and (E) we 
can deduce the following rule of inference for instrumental reasoning that has 
a preference as its conclusion: 
(RIP) Instrumental reasoning for a preference is valid if the 
preferred relatum of the conclusion entails a state of affairs that 
is (in this piece of reasoning) preferred to the state that is 
entailed by the dispreferred relatum of the conclusion. 
It is easy to use this rule for proving the validity of a piece of 
instrumental reasoning. Let us return to our example. Since the preferred 
relatum e entails p, which the mountaineer prefers to the state l that is 
entailed by the dispreferred relatum s, his reasoning is valid. It is worth 
mentioning that (RIP) states only a sufficient condition for the validity of a 
piece of instrumental reasoning. Whether it also provides a necessary 
condition is a question that I have not attempted to answer here. 
 
 
3.1. Conclusive reasons for acting 
 
Valid reasoning is not necessarily reason-giving. But when does a piece of 
valid instrumental reasoning provide a reason for acting? There is much 
disagreement on this and I shall be very brief about this issue here because 
the details are more than we need. Some hold that an agent has a reason for 
-ing if he believes that -ing stands in an appropriate instrumental relation 
to his end (e.g., Beardman 2007), while others insist that this belief must be 
justified or true (e.g., Williams 2001). Furthermore, on a traditional account 
of instrumental reasoning, any desire can generate reasons for acting. On this 
view, valuations are not justifiable because reason has nothing whatever to 
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do with the choice of ends.8 Other writers, however, hold that we have a 
reason for taking the means to an end only if we have a reason to pursue that 
end.9 
I side with those philosophers who require a justification for the belief 
premises, the valuational premises, and the inferential belief. That is to say, I 
am in agreement with those authors who hold that an agent has a reason for 
the conclusion if he has a justification for the premises and is justified in 
believing that these premises logically support the conclusion.10 
The mountaineer in our example has therefore an instrumental reason for 
preferring the eastern route to the southern route, if he is justified in 
believing that the eastern route leads to the peak while the southern route 
leads to a glacial lake, if, in addition, he has a reason for preferring the peak 
to the lake, and if he is justified in believing that these premises logically 
support his preference for the eastern route.11 I wish to emphasize here that 
throughout this essay I assume that the agent has these justifications. 
I can now explain why the mountaineer in our example has a conclusive 
reason for taking the eastern route. The logical anatomy of his reasoning is 
quite simple. The preferred relatum of the conclusion (taking the eastern 
route) entails a state of affairs that is preferred to the outcomes entailed by 
any of its alternatives. (Our example is a particularly simple case of reasoning 
because there is only one alternative to taking the eastern route.) In general 
terms, if the structure of a piece of instrumental reasoning is such that the 
preferred relatum of the conclusion logically entails an outcome that stands 
highest in the agent’s ranking and choosing any alternative entails a worse 
outcome, then the agent has a logically conclusive instrumental reason for 
choosing this relatum. In our example, the mountaineer has therefore a 
conclusive reason for taking the eastern route. 
                                                 
8 Compare to this Nozick (1993, xiv) and Maurice Allais is quoted by Broome (1995, 104-5) 
as saying, “It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there are no criteria for the 
rationality of ends as such other than the condition of consistency. Ends are completely 
arbitrary.” 
9 Among them are Audi (2004), Korsgaard (1997), Raz (2005) and Schroeder (2007), who 
holds that we have a clear intuition that there is no reason to do what promotes irrational 
desires (p. 120). 
10 Compare to this the large literature on closure for justification in epistemology. 
11 Strictly speaking, an agent needs to satisfy a number of further conditions for having an 
instrumental reason. For instance, he needs to have the beliefs and preferences at the same 
interval of time. However, since I am in this paper concerned with the varieties of practical 
reasons that depend on their logical structure, this is not the place for a full-scale 
discussion of these issues. 
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It is worth noticing that an agent can have a conclusive reason for acting, 
even if this action has a bad outcome. The proof is short and simple. The 
reasoning B(a  x¯), B(b  y¯), x¯  y¯ ╞ a  b is valid (‘x¯’ and ‘y¯’ indicate 
negative outcomes); and the agent has a conclusive reason for a-ing. This 
shows that the logic behind the so-called “Principle of the Lesser Evil” is 
sound. This principle holds that if we have to choose between two evils, the 
lesser evil ought to be chosen. An agent can thus have the strongest possible 
reason for choosing an evil. 
In our everyday discourse we may express this conclusive reason by 
saying that the mountaineer must take the eastern route. Observe, however, 
that we can use any of a number of phrases to express conclusive reasons 
because ordinary language does not uphold a sharp distinction between 
different deontic modals. For example, we could say just as effectively that 
the mountaineer has to take the eastern route or that he ought to do so. 
From a logical point of view, conclusive reasons are the strongest kind of 
practical reasons. Acting on them is always (pro tanto) reasonable and not 
acting on them is always (pro tanto) unreasonable. We shall see below that 
there are also logically weaker instrumental reasons for acting. 
 
3.2. Better reasons for acting 
 
Let us revise our initial example. There is now a western route too, which 
leads to a plateau. The mountaineer prefers the peak to the lake and the lake 
to the plateau.12 To clarify the logical structure of this piece of reasoning, it 
will be helpful to formalize itusing ‘w’ for ‘I take the western route’ and ‘a’ 
for ‘I reach the plateau.’ The premises B(e  p), B(s  l), B(w  a), p  l, l  
a logically entail the conclusion (s  w).13 That is to say, the mountaineer 
should prefer the southern route to the western route; and since we assume 
that he has a justification for the premises, he has a better reason for taking 
the southern route. 
In general, if the structure of a piece of instrumental reasoning is such 
                                                 
12 Throughout this paper I shall assume that agents are not inconsistent in the sense that 
they prefer one thing to a second, the second to a third, and the third to the first. 
However, I do not assume that the outcomes are completely ranked. They may only be 
partially ordered, but completeness is, of course, not excluded. 
13 This can easily be proved. The preferred relatum s, together with the propositional 
contents of the premises B(e  p), B(s  l) and B(w  a)that is, (e  p), (s  l) and (w 
 a)entails l, which is preferred to the state a that is entailed by the dispreferred 
relatum w. By (RIP), the reasoning is therefore valid. 
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that the preferred relatum  of the conclusion logically entails an outcome 
that is preferred to the outcome that follows from an alternative  then an 
agent has a logically better reason for -ing than for -ing. 
It is to be noted that taking the southern route is a necessary means for 
an end of the mountaineer. Nonetheless, he has now only a weaker reason 
than in the example of the previous subsection. This is so because the logical 
strength of a practical reason does not only depend on the outcome of an act, 
but also on the alternatives of this act. In the case under consideration, the 
outcome of taking the southern route is not preferred to the outcomes 
entailed by any of its alternatives. It is only preferred to the outcomes of 
some of its alternatives and therefore the agent has only a better reason but 
not a conclusive reason for taking the southern route. 
Since better reasons are weaker than conclusive reasons, acting on a 
better reason is not always reasonable. In our example, it is not reasonable to 
take the southern route because there is a better alternative available. But 
sometimes it is reasonable to act on a better reason. Taking the eastern route 
is better than taking the southern route and the mountaineer chooses 
rationally if he takes it. Alternately, it can be unreasonable not to act on a 
better reason (e.g., not to take the eastern route), but sometimes it is not 
unreasonable not to act on such a reason (e.g., not to take the southern 
route). 
We can express this kind of instrumental reason in different ways. 
Colloquially, we may say that taking the southern route is better than taking 
the western route or by holding that the southern route is preferable to the 
western route. 
 
 
4. Reasoning for Dispreferences 
 
Sometimes the conclusion of a piece of instrumental reasoning is a 
dispreference. Let us reconsider the scenario from Subsection (2.1). The 
mountaineer wants to scale a peak and there are only two routesthe eastern 
route, which leads to the peak, and the southern route to a glacial lake. Since 
the mountaineer prefers the peak to the lake, he disprefers taking the 
southern route, which he may express by saying that he must not take this 
route. 
For definiteness, let us symbolize this piece of reasoning, using the 
variables from Section 2. The formalized valid argument is then B(e  p), 
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B(s  l), p  l ╞ s  e. This argument is valid iff the premises and the 
negation of the conclusion are inconsistentwhich is to say that it is valid iff 
the set {B(e  p), B(s  l), p  l, (s  e)} is inconsistent. Again, on the 
plausible assumption that (e  s)  (e  s)  (s  e), it follows from (s  e) 
that (e  s)  (e  s); and for this reason we can replace the above set by the 
set {B(e  p), B(s  l), p  l, (e  s)  (e  s)} and test it for practical 
inconsistency. 
To avoid tedium, I shall not repeat my reasoning from Section 2 which 
applies, upon changing what needs to be changed, to our scenario too. But 
from the principle of valid instrumental reasoning (P) and analogous 
considerations as in Section 2, we get this rule of inference for instrumental 
reasoning that has a dispreference as its conclusion: 
(RID) Instrumental reasoning for a dispreference is valid if 
the dispreferred relatum of the conclusion entails a state of 
affairs that is (in this piece of reasoning) dispreferred to the state 
that is entailed by the preferred relatum of the conclusion. 
In our simple scenario, the dispreferred relatum of the conclusion is s, and 
the preferred relatum of the conclusion is e. The dispreferred relatum s, 
together with the propositional contents of the premises (e  p) and (s  l) 
entails l, which is dispreferred to the state p that is entailed by the preferred 
relatum e. Hence, by (RID) the reasoning is valid. 
 
 
4.1. Conclusive reasons against acting 
 
If the structure of instrumental reasoning is such that the dispreferred 
relatum of the conclusion logically entails the worst outcome (that is, an 
outcome such that none is worse in the agent’s estimation) and there is at 
least one alternative that entails a better outcome, then the agent has a 
logically conclusive reason against choosing this relatum. In our elementary 
example, there is an outcome to which the mountaineer prefers every 
otherreaching the lake. He has therefore a conclusive reason against taking 
the southern route. 
In the introduction I have claimed that we need not have a reason for 
taking a necessary means to our ends. In order to see why this is so, it is once 
more helpful to consider our simple example. Suppose that the mountaineer 
wants both, standing on the summit and reaching the lake, but he prefers the 
former. Taking the southern route is then still a necessary means to his end of 
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reaching the lake. But he does not have a reason for taking this route. He has 
rather a reason against taking it. 
Logically seen, conclusive reasons against acting are the strongest reasons 
that we can have for not performing an act. It is therefore always (pro tanto) 
unreasonable to perform such an act, but it is not always reasonable not to 
perform it. Since this last claim may not be quite clear, I wish to labour this 
point a bit. If there are more than two options, not choosing the worst option 
is tantamount to choosing any of its alternatives. If the agent chooses an 
option that is better than the worst alternative but worse than some other 
available alternative, then he does not choose the worst option but his choice 
is still unreasonable. 
It goes without saying that we need not express a conclusive reason 
against performing an action by holding that we must not choose it. We can 
alternatively use words like ‘illicit’ or ‘forbidden’, which are often used as 
synonyms of ‘must not’; and sometimes it would be even more natural to say 
‘You can’t ’. 
 
 
4.2. Worse reasons for acting 
 
Let us now return to the scenario considered in Subsection (2.2). There are 
now three routes. The western one leads to the plateau, which is dispreferred 
both to the lake and the peak. Therefore, the mountaineer draws the 
conclusion that taking the western route is worse than taking the southern 
route. By formalizing this reasoning, using the variables from Subsection 
(2.2), we get B(e  p), B(s  l), B(w  a), p  l, l  a ╞ w  s. According to 
(RID), this reasoning is valid because w (the dispreferred conclusion relatum) 
entailstogether with the propositional contents of the belief premisesa, 
which is dispreferred to l that is entailed by s (the preferred conclusion 
relatum). 
The logical structure of this reasoning is such that the outcome of taking 
the western route is worse than the outcome of taking the southern route. 
The mountaineer has therefore a logically worse reason for taking the western 
route than for taking the southern one. Generally speaking, if -ing entails an 
outcome that is worse (in the agent’s estimation) than the consequences of -
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ing then the agent has a worse reason for -ing than for -ing.14 
Acting on such a reason is always unreasonable because there is 
necessarily a better alternative available. Not acting on a worse reason is, 
however, not ipso facto reasonable. Our example can make clear why this is 
so. Not taking the western route can mean taking the southern route, which 
is not reasonable because there is an even better option availabletaking the 
eastern route. 
Of course, ordinary speech usually replaces the stilted term ‘worse reason’ 
with something plainer. We may say that it is better not to take the western 
route or that taking the latter is not as good as the former.  
 
 
5. Reasoning for Indifferences 
 
To illustrate reasoning that has an “indifference”-conclusion, we can return 
to the simpler version of our example with two routes only. We assume now 
that the mountaineer is indifferent between standing on the summit and 
reaching the lake. He is therefore indifferent between the two routes, which 
he may express by saying that it does not matter which one he takes. 
In order to see things in a better light, it will again be helpful to translate 
the reasoning into symbolic form. If we use the same variables and the 
symbol ‘’ for denoting the indifference relation we get this formal argument: 
B(e  p), B(s  l), p  l ╞ e  s. The first two premises express beliefs and 
the third premise and the conclusion express the agent’s indifferences. 
As I have argued in Section 1, this reasoning is valid iff the set consisting 
of the premises and the negation of the conclusion is inconsistent. That is to 
say, it is valid iff the set {B(e  p), B(s  l), p  l, (e  s)} is inconsistent. 
Assuming that e and s are commensurable, this set is inconsistent if {B(e  
p), B(s  l), p  l, (e  s)  (e  s)} is inconsistent(e  s)  (e  s) follows 
from (e  s)  (e  s)  (s  e) and (e  s). Once again, it is this set which we 
need to test for inconsistency. 
Let us first consider it on an intuitive level. If you believe that taking the 
eastern route has an outcome that you value equally to the outcome of taking 
the southern route then you are practically inconsistent if you are not 
indifferent between these routes too (except you can show that the routes are 
                                                 
14 It may be illuminating to draw attention to the fact that the agent has a worse reason 
for taking the southern route than for taking the eastern route, too. This can easily be 
proved by using our formalization. 
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different with respect to some other relevant factors, which, of course, 
changes our example). I think this is obvious upon consideration. In the light 
of this, we can now formulate the following inferential rule for reasoning that 
has an indifference as its conclusion: 
(RII) Instrumental reasoning that has an “indifference”-
conclusion is valid if the relata of the conclusion entail indifferent 
states of affairs. 
To return to our example, the relata of the “indifference”-conclusion are 
e and s, which entail the indifferent states p and l. Hence, the reasoning is 
valid. 
 
 
5.1. Optional reasons for acting 
 
If a piece of valid instrumental reasoning for an indifference is such that the 
relata of the “indifference”-conclusion entail outcomes such that the agent 
prefers no other to them then the agent has a reason, which, for want of a 
better term, I label ‘optional reason’. Let us return once more to the case of 
the mountaineer. Since he is indifferent between the peak and the lake and 
there is no better option available, he has an optional reason for taking either 
of them. 
The case of Buridan’s ass may be useful for further clarifying this type of 
reason. In that famous story a donkey was standing between two bales of 
hay, neither appealed to him more than the other. Being indifferent between 
the bales, that unfortunate creature saw no reason for moving one way rather 
than the other and starved in the midst of plenty. Given his indifference, that 
donkey had reasons of equal logical strength for going right and for going 
left. But notice that he did not have an optional reason for moving neither 
side. It was a logical mistake that he neither moved to the right nor to the 
left because he had an option that bested the two alternatives he pondered. 
The donkey should have reasoned as followsusing ‘l’ for ‘I go left,’ ‘r’ for ‘I 
go right,’ and ‘b’ for ‘I can eat a bale of hay’: B(l  b), B(r  b), B((l  r) 
 b), (b  b), therefore, (l  r)   (l  r). That is to say, he had a 
conclusive reason for going left or right. Logic did not tell him to which side, 
but tossing a coin would have settled the issue. 
Acting on optional reasons is never unreasonable because if you have 
such a reason there is no better option available. Not acting on them is 
unreasonable in cases where the agent chooses an alternative that is worse. It 
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is not unreasonable if he chooses one of the other options at the top. In our 
simple example, not choosing the eastern route was tantamount to taking the 
southern route. This was a reasonable choice, given that these routes were the 
mountaineer’s only options. In ordinary speech, optional reasons can be 
expressed in different ways. The mountaineer could have said that he can 
take the eastern (or southern) route, that he has the option of taking either of 
them, or that choosing one of them is possible or permissible. 
As I have just outlined, the mountaineer had an instrumental reason for 
taking the eastern route. Butand this is the pointthis does not imply 
that he ought to take it (pace Kearns and Star 2008). If we express reasons 
for acting by using deontic modalities we can sometimes use the word ‘ought’. 
It is appropriate if we have conclusive reasons. But if we have logically 
weaker reasons (e.g., optional reasons) then we need to choose weaker deontic 
terms. 
The upshot of what I have been saying in this essay is as follows. In all 
scenarios considered in the previous sections, different instrumental reasons 
were generated depending solely on the different logical structure of the 
reasoning. Take that mountaineer again and suppose that there is the 
eastern, southern, and western route and that he prefers the peak to the lake 
and the lake to the plateau. He has then not just an instrumental reason to 
take one of the routes. He rather has a conclusive reason for taking the 
eastern route; a better reason for taking the southern route than for taking 
the western route; a worse reason for taking the southern route than for 
taking the eastern route, and a conclusive reason against taking the western 
route. Furthermore, if he is indifferent between the peak and the lake he has 
optional reasons for taking the eastern route and for taking the southern 
route. 
In this study I have been trying to explain the logical determination of 
instrumental reasons. However, I do not for a moment mean to imply that 
the kind of justification which an agent has for his premises is irrelevant to 
practical reasons. But a consideration of this issue would have taken us 
beyond the confines of the present work. 
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